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Abstact
This article explores the Rawlsian goal of ensuring that distributions
are not influenced by the morally arbitrary. It does so by bringing dis-
cussions of distributive justice into contact with the debate over
moral luck initiated by Williams and Nagel. Rawls’ own justice as
fairness appears to be incompatible with the arbitrariness commit-
ment, as it creates some equalities arbitrarily. A major rival,
Dworkin’s version of brute luck egalitarianism, aims to be continuous
with ordinary ethics, and so is (a) sensitive to non-philosophical be-
liefs about free will and responsibility, and (b) allows inequalities to
arise on the basis of option luck. But Dworkin does not present con-
vincing reasons in support of continuity, and there are compelling
moral reasons for justice to be sensitive to the best philosophical ac-
count of free will and responsibility, as is proposed by the revised
brute luck egalitarianism of Arneson and Cohen. While Dworkinian
brute luck egalitarianism admits three sorts of morally arbitrary dis-
advantaging which correspond to three forms of moral luck (constitu-
tive, circumstantial, and option luck), revised brute luck egalitarian-
ism does not disadvantage on the basis of constitutive or circumstan-
tial luck. But it is not as sensitive to responsibility as it needs to be to
fully extinguish the influence of the morally arbitrary, for persons un-
der it may exercise their responsibility equivalently yet end up with
different outcomes on account of option luck. It is concluded that
egalitarians should deny the existence of distributive luck, which is
luck in the levels of advantage that individuals are due.
1. Introduction
In a key passage of his classic work A Theory of Justice, John Rawls makes this obser-
vation:
once we are troubled by the influence of either social contingencies or natural
chance on the determination of distributive shares, we are bound, on reflection,
to be bothered by the influence of the other. From a moral standpoint the two
seem equally arbitrary (Rawls 1999: 64-5).
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at an AHRC Foundations of Egalitarian Justice work-
shop at the University of Exeter. I would like to thank the audience on that occasion for their helpful
comments. Research for this article was undertaken during a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship
held at the University of Glasgow.
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Rawls sought to harness the morally arbitrary distributive influence of such things as
class and native ability for the morally compelling objective of improving the condi-
tion of the worst off group. Much recent work on egalitarian justice has, however,
been concerned with a different response to the bothersome distributive influence of
variations in social circumstances and natural talent. Rawls says little about why such
influence is morally arbitrary, or why it is that ‘[n]o one deserves his greater natural
capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society’ (Rawls 1999: 87). One
obvious answer, which Rawls himself does not offer, is that the influence is not the
upshot of choice on the part of those who benefit or lose out from it. The resulting in-
equality people suffer is therefore a matter of luck for them – it results from something
other than their choices. This explanation of the problem with distributions that are in-
fluenced by differential social circumstances and natural talents takes such distribu-
tions to be morally arbitrary, and hence unjust, because they are influenced by luck in
one way or another. We may fill out this explanation in several ways.
Ronald Dworkin suggests that inequality might be acceptable were it the upshot of
option luck: were it, that is, ‘a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn
out - whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she
should have anticipated and might have declined’ (Dworkin 2000: 73). But where so-
cial circumstances and natural talent have created inequality, it is the upshot of brute
luck - ‘a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles’
(Dworkin 2000: 73). The view that inequalities traceable to choice are justifiable, but
that inequalities not so traceable are objectionable, might be called brute luck egalitar-
ianism. Where there are no deliberate gambles, and distributions are only affected by
brute luck, it demands equality.2 Where, however, option luck is in play, inequalities
may arise. As Dworkin puts it, ‘[i]n principle … individuals should be relieved of con-
sequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute
bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from their own choices’
(Dworkin 2000: 287). Brute luck egalitarianism maintains that the social and natural
variations that Rawls describes are morally arbitrary because they only reflect brute
luck. People do not in any way choose their social starting positions or native abilities.
But brute luck egalitarianism allows that other variations between people may reflect
option luck, and so be non-arbitrary grounds for distributive inequality. On this view,
an individual’s holdings may be influenced by luck – influenced, that is, by things
they have not chosen – but only insofar as exposure to that luck is itself chosen. This
allows the results of a typical gamble to stand, for though each gambler has not chosen
the result, as they might have had they loaded the dice, they have chosen to gamble.
In spite of what Dworkin holds applies in principle, his settled position does not
seek to fully neutralize brute luck, and he explicitly distances himself from luck egali-
tarianism (Dworkin 2003). Nevertheless, there is clearly a brute luck egalitarian strand
to his political philosophy, and it may be the most influential of its strands. This article
is concerned with examining Dworkin’s brute luck egalitarianism, particularly regard-
ing its ability to address the issue of morally arbitrary distributive influences. Will
Kymlicka has interpreted Dworkin’s theory as handling this issue, as raised by Rawls,
more effectively than Rawls himself (Kymlicka 1990). Much of the implicit appeal of
Dworkin’s position relies on the effectiveness of its response to moral arbitrariness.
But I argue that its response suffers from several shortfalls.
2 For discussion of the ‘equality-default view’ see Hurley 2003: 153-4, 172.
A further concern is to show that a shift from Dworkin’s non-metaphysical sense of
brute luck – one which is unconcerned by the wider philosophical debate about free
will and responsibility – to the metaphysical sense of brute luck suggested by Richard
Arneson and G. A. Cohen is justified (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989). This justification
can be rendered in terms of better realizing the goal of eliminating the influence of
those things which are morally arbitrary. But I want to suggest that that goal, which
has shaped much of the post-Rawlsian discussion of the roles of responsibility, choice
and luck in egalitarian justice, ought to motivate a further shift away from Dworkin.
In making my argument I seek to bring the recent discussion of luck and distributive
justice into contact with another prominent strand of contemporary philosophical in-
vestigation which it has thus far remained detached from, in spite of obvious similarity
of theme.3 This is the debate over moral luck, or luck in becoming worthy of praise,
blame, reward, or penalty. Drawing on Bernard Williams’ and Thomas Nagel’s semi-
nal essays on this debate, I argue that contemporary egalitarians ought to deny the ex-
istence of a relative of moral luck – specifically, distributive luck, or luck in the levels
of advantage people are due. That is, they should insist that distributions must be un-
mediated by any form of luck.
The article is arranged as follows. In section 2 I argue that Rawls’ own position ar-
guably admits moral arbitrariness in the form of arbitrary equalities, and that brute
luck egalitarianism provides a suitable corrective to that problem. In section 3 I argue
that Dworkin’s brute luck egalitarianism may nevertheless treat people arbitrarily
where actual choice and agent responsibility come apart, and that his appeal to per-
sonal ethics does not provide any valid justification for such treatment. In section 4 I
describe the position of mainstream luck egalitarians such as Arneson and Cohen and
show that they do not treat persons arbitrarily as Dworkin does, this being on account
of their focus on agent responsibility. In section 5 I enumerate three forms of luck –
constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, and option luck – and explain the difference be-
tween the moral and distributive versions of them. In section 6 I suggest that these
three kinds of luck correspond to three forms of arbitrariness that Dworkinian brute
luck egalitarianism fails to address, and that one of these – that arising from distribu-
tive option luck – also poses a problem for Arneson and Cohen’s revised luck egalitar-
ianism, for it is morally arbitrary for some to gain and some to lose out from identical
gambles. In section 7 I argue that egalitarians would do best to abandon brute luck
egalitarianism and instead deny the existence of distributive luck or (what comes to
the same thing) endorse ‘all luck egalitarianism’, thereby expunging moral arbitrari-
ness from distributions.
2. An Argument for Brute Luck Egalitarianism
Rawls’ response to the arbitrariness of social and natural inequalities is to use them to
the benefit of the worst off. As he puts it, ‘the basic structure can be arranged so that
these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate’ (Rawls 1999: 87). But
Rawls’ favoured ‘difference principle’ actually arranges all social and economic in-
equalities to the benefit of the least advantaged.4 Such an indiscriminate regime may
seem inappropriate given that some inequalities appear less arbitrary than others. As
Kymlicka asks, ‘[w]hat if I was not born into a privileged social group, and was not
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2012, 31(2) 543
3 An exception is Otsuka 2009, which uses notions of luck in distributive justice to illuminate the moral
luck debate. My strategy here is quite the reverse.
4 Provided, that is, that equal basic liberties and fair equal opportunity are provided; see Rawls 1999:
266.
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born with any special talents, and yet by my own choices and effort have managed to
secure a larger income than others?’ (Kymlicka 1990: 58). Rawls does not explain
why the difference principle regulates all inequalities, rather than just – to use
Dworkin’s terminology – brute luck inequalities. On the face of it it seems unfair to
subsidize the choices of those who want to play tennis all day at the expense of the
identically endowed who instead engage in productive gardening. But applying the
difference principle to undo chosen inequalities has just that effect (Kymlicka 1990:
73-6).
These considerations bring out the attractions of brute luck egalitarianism. Rawls’
difference principle effectively addresses the problem of arbitrary inequalities, but in
doing so it creates a new problem of ‘arbitrary equalities’ – distributive shares are
equalized even though inequalities would be more appropriate given the differences in
people’s choices. Brute luck egalitarianism appears able to overcome both problems.
Where the effects of brute luck are equalized, all remaining inequalities and equalities
have arisen non-arbitrarily in that the inequalities have come about as a result of
choice, and the equalities have come about as a result of the absence of (relevant)
choice.
Brute luck egalitarianism is, in my view, an advance on Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’,
as it acknowledges that equalities can sometimes be morally arbitrary, unfair, and even
unequal in the relevant sense.5 But different forms of arbitrariness may be introduced
by (a) Dworkin’s favoured interpretation of choice as non-metaphysical and (b) his fo-
cus on combating only brute luck. I consider (a) in detail in the next section, and (b) in
section 6. In the remainder of this section I describe a core feature of Dworkin’s posi-
tion that explain his stance on both (a) and (b).
Dworkin observes that ‘[w]e take responsibility for our choices in a variety of ways’
(Dworkin 2000: 323). We blame ourselves when we decide that we should have cho-
sen differently, we assess the ambitions which motivate our choices, and we are will-
ing to change our character where it has led us to make disfavoured choices. Our
choices contrast with our circumstances, which we do not take responsibility for (ex-
cept where they follow from our choices). This distinction is essential to ‘first-person
ethics’ in Dworkin’s view:
We might think ourselves persuaded, intellectually, of the philosophical thesis
that people have no free will, and that we are no more causally responsible for
our fate when it is the upshot of our choices than when it flows only from a
handicap or from society’s distribution of wealth. But we cannot lead a life out
of that philosophical conviction. We cannot plan or judge our lives except by
distinguishing what we must take responsibility for, because we chose it, and
what we cannot take responsibility for because it was beyond our control
(Dworkin 2000: 323).
Dworkin goes on to identify his theory of justice as being ‘[e]thically sensitive (or
“continuous”)’ in the sense that it ‘grow[s] out of our internal lives’ and bases its
judgements ‘on assignments of responsibility drawn from ethics – assignments that
distinguish between choice and circumstance in the way just described’ (Dworkin
2000: 323).
5 ‘Rawls requires that [the gardener] pay for the costs of her own choices, and also subsidize [the tennis
player’s] choice. That does not promote equality, it undermines it’ (Kymlicka 1990: 74; see also Cohen
1989: 911).
On Dworkin’s view, then, choices and their consequences (matters of option luck)
must be assigned to the individual, and circumstances and their consequences (matters
of brute luck) not assigned to the individual, even when it comes to a political distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens. Furthermore, whether something is a matter of brute luck
or option luck – that is, whether it has arisen from an earlier choice – is independent of
the best philosophical account of free will and responsibility. Both of these features
are explained by Dworkin’s insistence on continuity between everyday ethics and po-
litical philosophy.6
3. Against Continuity
It seems broadly right to say that people distinguish between choices and circum-
stances in the stark way Dworkin describes, and it is probably also correct that people
generally can not help but blame themselves for their bad choices and blame others (or
no one at all) for their bad circumstances. But it is quite a jump from there to the con-
clusion that distributive justice should track the same distinction. If ‘hard determinism’
is true, so there can be no free will and no true agent responsibility – no responsibility
in a deep, morally- and metaphysically-valid way – it might follow that the people had
best continue as though free will and responsibility did exist. This may have beneficial
consequences in terms of both social regulation and individuals’ mental well-being.
But it does not at all follow that social institutions should fall under the same spell.
Treating individuals as though they are responsible for outcomes when it is known
they are not is manifestly arbitrary and unfair.
Suppose Sandy and Tony are both unemployed. Sandy’s unemployment largely or
wholly derives from a widely recognized congenital disability. The source of Tony’s
unemployment is rather different as he does not have any condition that is publicly ac-
cepted as a disability. His unemployment is, on the face of it, a direct result of his pre-
vious choices to not turn up at his workplaces on time: he has made choices which are
unmediated by luck in the sense that they could only possibly have led to his unem-
ployment. Tony blames his current circumstances on himself, while Sandy does not. A
brute luck egalitarian will note Sandy’s disability as an unfavourable circumstance as
regards getting a job, and therefore treat her relatively favourably, while Tony’s recal-
citrance is considered his choice, and so he is treated unfavourably – maybe his state
income support payments will be reduced to subsistence level, or cut off altogether.7
Now suppose that free will and responsibility are impossible. Even if we know that
this was the case, brute luck egalitarianism, following Dworkin, thinks it should make
no difference to how social institutions treat Tony. But why should we treat Tony as
responsible for being unemployed when we know that he is not? Sandy and Tony have
identical levels of responsibility for their predicaments – no responsibility whatsoever
– but brute luck egalitarianism treats them very differently. It compensates Sandy but
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2012, 31(2) 545
6 A third feature, Dworkin’s subjective account of advantage, is similarly grounded; see Knight 2009: ch.
1.
7 Some critics of luck egalitarianism find it hard to see how any assistance to imprudent persons such as
Tony might be justified by the view; see Fleurbaey 1995; Anderson 1999; Scheffler 2003. Elsewhere I
have defended the view that luck egalitarianism mandates at least some assistance; see Knight 2009, ch.
4.
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not Tony on the mere appearance that Sandy is less responsible than Tony. To com-
pensate the two at different levels is to distribute on morally arbitrary grounds.8
Brute luck egalitarianism is not only undermined where hard determinism, or similar
strongly sceptical views on free will and responsibility, are true. Any philosophical ac-
count of responsibility that requires something more than actual choice for responsibil-
ity to be present refuses to assign the kind of decisive weight to the choice/circum-
stance distinction that Dworkin says we assign in every day life. In a variant of the un-
employment scenario, we might imagine that responsibility is very much possible, but
that Tony has simply failed to satisfy one or more conditions for responsibility. Sup-
pose, for instance, that the correct view of responsibility is some form of
compatibilism that makes reason-responsiveness a condition for responsibility (see
Fischer and Ravizza 1998). In that case, if Tony’s choices were not responsive to rea-
sons (he acted very impulsively, say, and could not help but act in that way), he is not
responsible for the consequences. In this case, as with the last one, brute luck egalitari-
anism will treat Sandy better than Tony, even though neither is responsible for being
unemployed.
It might be replied that the differential treatment of Sandy and Tony is justified be-
cause of the necessity of them taking responsibility for their choices but not for their
circumstances. At first glance, this may not seem to present any justification at all. The
problem identified above was not that Sandy denied responsibility and Tony accepted
it. They could, in principle at least, continue to do that while distributions are made on
the basis of a different distinction, in (to use Dworkin’s terms) ethically insensitive
and discontinuous fashion.
The justification for treating Tony as consequentially responsible may, however, at-
tempt to enter via the back door. It might be thought very hard or impossible for Sandy
and Tony to continue to track the choice/circumstance distinction in their personal eth-
ics when society, through its distributive actions, tracks a contradictory distinction. I
think even this indirect defence of brute luck egalitarianism is unsuccessful. When
Dworkin says that personal ethics necessarily follows the choice/circumstance distinc-
tion he could mean this descriptively: this tracking will continue regardless of what
happens with distributive justice. This seems correct to at least some significant extent,
but it also undermines the claim that distributive justice must follow personal ethics,
lest personal ethics is deprived of its essential distinction between choices and
circumstances.
The brute luck egalitarian might then interpret the necessity of tracking the
choice/circumstance distinction as a moral necessity: it is possible for us not to track it,
but our personal ethics will then be unsettled, possibly with appalling consequences
for society. This echoes one of the insights of socially-regulative compatibilism, which
holds that, even in a world without free will, we will do best to hold people responsi-
ble as this has good consequences. But the brute luck egalitarian’s argument is much
harder to make than is the socially-regulative compatibilist’s. Our compatabilist ex-
plicitly has consequentialist – usually utilitarian – goals in mind, and need make no
claim to treating people fairly or equally. By contrast, the brute luck egalitarian, if she
is to be truly egalitarian, must combine a consequentialist justification for tracking the
8 Of course, if Sandy’s disability had disadvantages other than those relating to employment – for in-
stance, if it reduced her mobility – she may have a legitimate claim for assistance that would not be due
to Tony. But even then it would still be true that, as regards unemployment, their cases appear rele-
vantly identical, but are not treated as such by brute luck egalitarianism.
choice/circumstances distinction with a commitment to not treating persons arbitrarily.
Moreover, her consequentialist justification does not look particularly egalitarian: if
people stop tracking the choice/circumstances distinction, there might be some con-
fused ethical lives, and there might be problems of social organization, but there is no
clear reason for thinking that there would be increased inequality. There is no general
tendency for increased anxiety or disorder in society to make things less equal.
The brute luck egalitarian might claim that Tony is not worse off arbitrarily as wors-
ening his position is necessary to avoid the deleterious consequences of the choice/cir-
cumstance distinction being widely abandoned. But that sort of treatment of Tony is
arbitrary in the relevant egalitarian sense. When Rawls says that we are bothered by
the arbitrary influence of social contingencies and natural chance, he intended – or at
least, egalitarians read him as intending – that these things are arbitrary regardless of
whether they have good consequences. In certain circumstances a society structured
along lines of caste might yield the most well-being, but members of lower castes
would still be able to legitimately claim that they were arbitrarily disadvantaged.
Even if the choice/circumstances distinction might be undermined by a discontinu-
ous account of justice that disregarded it, and even if an abandonment of the distinc-
tion by the general population would have bad consequences, there is no egalitarian
argument for maintaining widespread recognition of the distinction by means of a
continuous account of justice that acknowledges it. Given that, in some conditions, the
choice/circumstances distinction is compatible with treating some persons less favour-
ably than others, on the flimsy grounds that some have a façade of responsibility while
others do not, it should not form the basis of a theory of egalitarian justice. Given our
attachment to the distinction in our personal ethics, it therefore seems that we must
reject continuity between personal ethics and distributive justice.
One result of this is that an argument for allowing option luck inequalities to stand,
as brute luck egalitarianism does, is removed. I will later discuss other such arguments
which do not rely on continuity. But the main result is that the basis for Dworkin’s
non-metaphysical sense of choice has been rejected. Theories of justice should be sen-
sitive to the best philosophical account of free will and responsibility. I will now con-
sider a version of brute-luck egalitarianism that is just that.
4. Revised Brute Luck Egalitarianism
Despite being the original form of the view, Dworkin’s brute luck egalitarianism is not
the standard version of the view. Luck egalitarians do not typically place significant
value on the choice/circumstance distinction as it is fleshed out by Dworkin, nor do
they recommend that brute bad luck, as it is described by Dworkin, be compensated
while the effects of option luck be allowed to stand. Writers such as Arneson and Co-
hen require that justice responds only to genuine choice, or only to agent responsibil-
ity – responsibility for really having brought something about. They do then reject
Dworkin’s goal of being consistent with ordinary people’s ethical beliefs (see
Dworkin 2000, 289-90), and are metaphysically sensitive to the extent that, were hard
determinism true, their luck egalitarianism would amount to outcome egalitarianism,
for the relevant kind of choice would be impossible.9 I will refer to the standard luck
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2012, 31(2) 547
9 Arneson 1989: 86; Cohen 1993: 28. These and other statements by those two influential luck egalitari-
ans show a clear metaphysical commitment, but misunderstandings of their positions are possible as
they take the understandable terminological shortcut of continuing to talk of choice and brute luck with-
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egalitarian position as revised brute luck egalitarianism.10 It aims, in Cohen’s words,
‘to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipulatively) mean disadvantage
for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible, since it does not appropriately re-
flect choices that he has made or would make’ (Cohen 1989: 916).
Arneson suggests the norm ‘[o]ther things equal, it is bad if some people are worse
off than others through no voluntary choice or fault of their own’ (Arneson 1989: 85).
Cohen makes a similar suggestion:
In my view, a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the
influence of brute luck on distribution … . Brute luck is an enemy of just equal-
ity, and, since effects of genuine choice contrast with brute luck, genuine
choice excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities (Cohen 1989: 931).
On the face of it these remarks appear to be supportive of Dworkin’s brute luck egali-
tarianism. This support is, however, qualified in a significant way. Arneson is clear
that his luck egalitarian position, ‘equal opportunity for welfare’, is sensitive to the
metaphysics of free will and responsibility:
The norm of equal opportunity for welfare is distinct from equality of welfare
only if some version of soft determinism or indeterminism is correct. If hard
determinism is true, the two interpretations of equality come to the same
(Arneson 1989: 86).
Cohen’s requirement that choices be ‘genuine’ if they are to have distributive conse-
quences has similar implications. He is willing to acknowledge that placing ‘choice
central to distributive justice lands political philosophy in the morass of the free will
problem’, and that ‘[r]eplacing Dworkin’s cut [between preferences and resources] by
the one I have recommended subordinates political philosophy to metaphysical ques-
tions that may be impossible to answer’ (Cohen 1989: 934). According to Cohen,
‘[t]he right cut is between responsibility and bad luck’ (Cohen 1989: 922), and accord-
ing to Arneson inequalities between people are justified only where they ‘are due to
their voluntary choice or differentially negligent behavior for which they are rightly
deemed personally responsible’ (Arneson 1989: 86).
Revised luck egalitarians seek to equalize the effects of a metaphysically-sensitive
form of brute luck on how well people’s lives go – or what comes to the same thing,
neutralize the effects of metaphysical brute luck on how well people’s lives go. They
hold that inequalities are only justified where they reflect differential exercises of re-
sponsibility. While Dworkin views our philosophical beliefs about free will and re-
sponsibility as irrelevant to distributive justice, Arneson and Cohen view them as cen-
tral to our understanding of distributive justice. As Arneson puts it when explaining
his equal opportunity for welfare principle, ‘talk of “opportunity” is a stand-in for
whatever factors affecting preference formation we decide should be treated as matters
of individual responsibility’ (Arneson 1990: 175).
out always explicitly marking the important break from Dworkin. This is because Dworkin was not
clear that he intended the option luck/brute luck distinction to correspond to a metaphysically shallow
choice/circumstance distinction.
10 It is tempting to refer to the view as ‘thin luck egalitarianism’, using Susan Hurley’s definition of ‘thin
luck’ as the inverse of responsibility (Hurley 2003: ch. 4). However, this may not be exactly accurate as
Hurley seems to have something closer to moral responsibility than agent responsibility in mind. Luck
egalitarians like Arneson and Cohen need not require that agents are morally responsible for some thing
in order for it to be distributively significant (cf. section 5 below).
Revised brute luck egalitarianism deals well with the challenge posed by the unem-
ployment example. If Tony has not genuinely chosen to have such a poor track record
in employment – if, for instance, responsibility is impossible, or if due to some feature
of his upbringing it is impossible for him to hold down a job – he is due full compen-
sation on the revised account. He has on the face of it made a different choice from
Sandy, but if that appearance does not track a difference in agent responsibility he will
be treated no differently from how Sandy is treated, so there will be no arbitrariness or
unfairness in how their cases are handled.
5. Moral Luck and Distributive Luck
Thus far we have only encountered one of several powerful objections to Dworkinian
brute luck egalitarianism. Furthermore, one kind of unfairness may arise even under
revised brute luck egalitarianism. To see this first consider three specific forms of
luck, each of which corresponds to a specific form of potential unfairness, and each of
which is discussed in two classic papers by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel
(Williams 1976; Nagel 1976). Williams and Nagel were canvassing varieties of moral
luck, or luck in becoming worthy of praise, blame, reward, or penalty. In due course I
will explain how their insights can be adapted to our questions of political philosophy.
First, there is constitutive luck, which in Williams’ and Nagel’s context refers to
luck in one’s ‘dispositions of morality, however far back they are placed in the area of
intention and motive’ (Williams 1976: 116). Some people have characteristics – of
warmth, or attentiveness, or industry, say – that are commonly held to make them ap-
propriately subject to praise, while others’ coldness, thoughtlessness, or laziness make
them appropriate subjects of condemnation according to everyday morality. Neither
praise nor condemnation in such cases is dependent on correspondingly good or bad
actions, nor is it dependent on the underlying characteristics having any grounding in
agency. It seems, then, that one may have good or bad moral luck in being constitu-
tively disposed or disinclined towards performing one’s duties and supererogatory
actions.
Second, there is circumstantial luck, or luck in the challenges we are presented with.
As Nagel recognizes, ‘[t]he things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face,
are importantly determined by factors beyond our control’ (Nagel 1976: 145). One
person might dive into a fast-flowing river to save a child while another, who is dis-
posed to display similar heroism, never has any such opportunity. It would seem
strange to extend the same degree of acclaim to both persons, even were we certain
that the second person would make the same decision. There is at least a prima facie
case for saying that moral appraisal can be influenced by luck in the circumstances to
which individuals have to respond.
Finally, there is what Nagel describes as ‘luck, good and bad, in the way things turn
out’, and which for the sake of terminological consistency can be referred to as option
luck.11 In a famous example, a lorry driver has not checked his brakes recently, and
this minor negligence contributes to the death of a child. Nagel writes that ‘what
makes this a case of moral luck is that he would have to blame himself only slightly
for the negligence itself if no situation arose which required him to brake suddenly and
violently to avoid hitting a child’ (Nagel 1976, 141). Ordinary morality, at least, rec-
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2012, 31(2) 549
11 Nagel 1976: 140. In the literature on moral luck this concept is usually referred to as consequential luck
or resultant luck; see Enoch and Marmor 2007: 40; Zimmerman 1987: 376.
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ommends that luck in the consequences of our actions makes a difference to how we
appraise them. The difference between a case where negligence leads to a death and a
case where negligence has no adverse consequences may, perhaps, be morally
significant, even if there is no difference in agency.
Before considering how constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, and option luck might
result in unfairness we should briefly consider what the relevant kinds of luck are in
these cases. First there is the question of luck itself, on which Williams is explicitly
ambiguous: ‘I shall use the notion of “luck” generously, undefinedly, but, I think,
comprehensibly’ (Williams 1976: 117). We can be more precise. As we have accepted
the ethically discontinuous views of Arneson and Cohen, the appropriate forms of
constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, and option luck are metaphysically sensitive,
which is to say that they all feature an absence of responsibility.12 When we address
constitutive luck we are concerned with features of persons’ dispositions for which
they are not responsible. When we address circumstantial luck we are concerned with
challenges people have to face in their lives for which they are not responsible. When
we address option luck we are concerned with how individuals’ actions affect the
world, where the individual is responsible for the actions but not fully for how they
pan out.
We must provide one further specification of the relevant kinds of luck. Luck egali-
tarianism claims to be an account of distributive justice, not an account of morality.
Our focus should therefore not be on moral forms of constitutive, circumstantial, and
option luck, but on distributive forms of them. We are, then, concerned not with moral
luck, or luck in becoming worthy of praise, blame, reward, or penalty, but rather with
distributive luck, which is luck in being due higher or lower levels of advantage. Dis-
tributive luck is a close relative of the more commonly discussed moral luck, but it dif-
fers from it in being focused on distributive effects. Instances of distributive luck need
not be cases of moral luck, and vice versa.
Some distributive consequences may be morally irrelevant. Political philosophers in
several different traditions hold that someone may be due some benefit or burden
without there being any corresponding moral appraisal. Both Rawls and the utilitarians
he was reacting against agree that distribution need not have anything to do with virtue
or praiseworthy conduct. Similarly, libertarianism allows historical entitlement to be
the measure of justice in the allocation of holdings without thereby being a measure of
moral worth. Its adherents do not typically hold, with Gordon Gekko in Wall Street,
that ‘greed … is good’, or even that ‘securing entitlements is good’: securing
entitlements is just good as regards one’s just holdings. It is conceivable that individu-
als have good or bad distributive luck on account of actions which have no impact on
how we should assess them morally, and therefore have no moral luck effects.
It is also possible that some moral consequences are distributively irrelevant. The
most obvious cases here concern superogatory action. When a passer-by jumps into a
river to save a struggling child, at such personal risk that he was not obligated to do
so, it is not usually thought that society is obligated to reward the Samaritan as a mat-
ter of justice. Moreover, on most moral views, even when an action is morally obliga-
tory, it need not have implications for justice. Most would hold that, were the child
12 Cf. Nagel on non-moral assessments of people: ‘We deplore madness or leprosy in ourselves and others,
we rejoice in beauty or talent, but these, though very basic, are not moral judgments. If we ask ourselves
why, the natural explanation is that these attributes are not the responsibility of their possessors, they
are merely good or back luck [sic]’ (Nagel 1976: 138).
drowning in a shallow pond, the passer-by ought to wade in and rescue the child, and
that censure would be appropriate should such risk-free assistance not be offered
(Singer 1972). But many would also hold that the rescuer did not, by virtue of the res-
cue, have a just claim to be compensated for their efforts. The concept of distributive
luck is, then, doubly dissociable from that of moral luck: in principle at least one can
have distributive luck without moral luck and moral luck without distributive luck.
6. Against Brute Luck Egalitarianism
The previous section suggests that our concern should be with distributive luck. But it
remains to be shown how constitutive luck, circumstantial luck, and option luck so
conceived might be problematic for the luck egalitarian. I will argue that each of these
kinds of distributive luck presents a different challenge to brute luck egalitarianism,
and that one of them casts doubt even on revised brute luck egalitarianism.
Distributive constitutive luck is, on the definitions provided above, something which
a person is not responsible for that affects the advantages they are due and which
arises from their dispositions. Constitutive luck seems problematic for Dworkin, but
not for Arneson or Cohen. The most familiar examples of (alleged) distributive consti-
tutive luck from the political philosophy literature concern individuals who are dis-
posed to have ‘expensive tastes’ – that is, who need above average resources to
achieve average welfare – and not on account of anything for which they are agent re-
sponsible (Arneson 1989: 81; Cohen 1989: 911, 918-20, 923, 927). Such cases may
well be instances of bad constitutive luck, but only if welfare provides (part of) the
correct account of advantage, something which Dworkin and others deny, and which I
stay neutral on here. Our earlier example of Tony provides a case of constitutive luck
which is less contingent on conceptions of advantage. Even if Tony is not responsible
for the fact that he is disposed to be an unsuitable employee, the upshot of that disposi-
tion (his ‘chosen’ unemployment) is grounds for him being disadvantaged, in terms of
resources and (we can assume) welfare, by Dworkinian brute luck egalitarianism. But
where revised brute luck egalitarianism is operative, there is no bad constitutive luck
here. Tony remains non-responsible for the fact that is disposed to be an unsuitable
employee, but the upshot of that disposition is no longer grounds for him being disad-
vantaged relative to others. Constitutive luck is a manifestation of the anti-egalitarian
arbitrariness of treatment that we have been trying to avoid, and the revised view,
unlike the original one, appears to be equipped to resist it.
When we are concerned with distributive circumstantial luck we are talking about
the challenges which a person faces but is not responsible for bringing about, and
which nevertheless affect the advantages they are due. Most central cases of circum-
stantial luck would be effectively handled by both versions of brute luck egalitarian-
ism. For example, the children of the poor generally face greater challenges than the
children of the rich in achieving similar goals, and the individual children of both
groups are neither responsible for nor have chosen these differential starting positions.
Any inequalities resulting from those starting positions rather than from responsible
acts or choices are matters of brute luck however we construe it, and as such are not
justified on brute luck egalitarian accounts of justice. It is in key cases of circumstan-
tial luck such as these that luck egalitarianism provides at least a prima facie appealing
account of why Rawls’ morally arbitrary influences are arbitrary.
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In some conceivable cases, however, Dworkinian brute luck egalitarianism may al-
low circumstantial luck to affect distributions. Suppose Tony is just as talented as
Vinny, but Vinny makes prudentially better decisions and holds down a job. Suppose
also that it is impossible for either Tony or Vinny to be responsible for their choices
(maybe hard determinism is true). Under brute luck egalitarianism Vinny will not only
have had good constitutive (dispositional) luck, but he will now have good circum-
stantial luck, as he will face a more favourable context of choice, with a more favour-
able selection of career options. Even if Tony’s character is altered and he is now just
as motivated to work as Vinny is, he still has bad circumstantial luck on account of his
patchy CV. But that bad luck would be eradicated were our brute luck egalitarianism
to be of the revised form. Society would no longer penalize Tony for having created
his current bad circumstances as it would treat the fact that he was not responsible for
creating them as decisive. Revised brute luck egalitarianism does, then, seem able to
cope with circumstantial luck.
How might distributive option luck be a problem for brute luck egalitarianism? Just
as in the out of control truck example where ‘the negligence is the same in both cases,
and the driver has no control over whether a child will run into his path’ (Nagel 1976:
141), so two agents may make similar decisions in the distributive realm, but one have
good results and the other bad. In fact, one kind of example often presented in support
of luck egalitarianism has this general form. Arneson criticizes equality of welfare on
the basis that ‘[i]ndividuals can arrive at different welfare levels due to choices they
make for which they alone should be held responsible’ (Arneson 1989: 83). He sup-
ports this point with the example of two people of identical abilities, tastes, and re-
sources who ‘voluntarily engage in high stakes gambling, from which one emerges
rich (with high expectation of welfare) and the other poor (with low welfare expecta-
tion)’, concluding that ‘it would be inappropriate to insist upon equality of welfare
when welfare inequality arises through the voluntary choice of the person who gets
lesser welfare’ (Arneson 1989: 84; see also Arneson 1990: 176). Option luck clearly
presents the strongest case for both forms of brute luck egalitarianism to allow distrib-
utive luck. Although individuals do not choose, and are not responsible for, the differ-
ences in outcomes of identical gambles, individuals have chosen and are responsible
for gambling. This is sufficient grounds for the brute luck egalitarian to let inequalities
stand, as they standardly require only that inequalities result from choice (be it
Dworkinian actual choice or Cohenian genuine – i.e., agent responsible – choice).
Why should option luck be allowed to stand? Why not prohibit gambles, or fully
compensate the losers at the expense of the winners? We have already rejected one ar-
gument Dworkin presents in favour of option luck inequalities, which concerns their
consistency with ordinary ethics. But this is not his only argument. He notes that ‘we
can say that the possibility of loss was part of the life they [gamblers] chose – that it
was the fair price of the possibility of gain’.13 But it is unclear why an egalitarian
should be interested in securing for individuals the possibility of creating inequalities
between themselves and others who have made similar (genuine) choices. This seems
like a recipe for the kind of moral arbitrariness that egalitarians seek to avoid. How
can the roll of a dice or toss of a coin be thought to carry sufficient moral weight to
13 Dworkin 2000: 74-5. In the same passage Dworkin suggests that there is no unfairness in some gam-
blers being better off than those who do not gamble. Although this is also a matter of option luck, I fo-
cus on luck among gamblers as this is the simplest case of option luck. For discussion of the issue I here
leave aside see Lippert-Rasmussen 2001: 552-4.
(potentially) make one person’s life go much better than a similarly responsible other
person’s?
Dworkin makes a suggestion that may seem to provide some of the missing moral
salience: ‘If winners were made to share their winnings with losers, then no one would
gamble, as individuals, and the kind of life preferred by those who in the end win and
those who lose would be unavailable’.14 The most obvious way of reading this is as
drawing attention to the harm that redistribution from winners to losers would do to
those individuals, and maybe to the character of society as a whole. Part of the attrac-
tion of luck egalitarianism may be the way it apparently combines a left-wing concern
with equality with a right-wing respect for individual choice (see Cohen 1989: 933). A
position that refused to allow the results of individuals’ choices to stand might seem to
have given up too much ground to the old left. But as Dworkin recognizes, this objec-
tion is not available to egalitarians. If equality could only be achieved where gambles
were prohibited or corrected after the event, egalitarians would be committed to such
action, even if it did make their position less attractive to those with weaker
commitments to equality.
Committed egalitarians would hardly be surprised or dismayed by the possibility
that some individuals would have to give something up to achieve social equality. But
might prohibition or correction of gambles make egalitarianism too unattractive for
those with a weaker attachment to equality? This worry is perhaps clearest where we
depart from classic gambles. For instance, if egalitarianism is the enemy of option
luck, it seems it would have to prohibit risky but potentially rewarding activities such
as mountain climbing and/or handsomely compensate injured climbers at the expense
of uninjured ones, and not as a matter of charity but as a matter of justice. Neither op-
tion may seem very appealing, but there is a simple reply. What egalitarians require
qua egalitarians need not be what they require all things considered. Brute luck egali-
tarians are usually pluralists, endorsing values other than equality (see Arneson 1999;
2000; 2011; Cohen 2008). There is no reason why egalitarians opposed to option luck
inequalities cannot take a similar stance. If, for instance, equality was endorsed as a
value alongside welfare promotion, as brute-luck egalitarians often suggest, the latter
would provide good reasons for keeping open risky but potentially rewarding activi-
ties, provided that the rewards were sufficiently large relative to the risks (and if they
were not, it is hard to see much justification for allowing the activity in the first place).
The egalitarian strand of the view could then be accommodated by some form of ‘soft’
compensation from uninjured risk takers to injured risk takers, with the revenue raised
by, for instance, the sale of climbing licences or a tax on climbing equipment. The
proposal of combating option luck can thus be combined with non-egalitarian values
for those of more qualified egalitarian views.
Might committed egalitarians object to this proposal? Dworkin’s concern with al-
lowing the results of choices to endure is framed in terms of equality:
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14 Dworkin 2000: 75. Dworkin here appears to be pushing for the strong conclusion that egalitarians have
course for regret when opportunities for option luck inequalities are cut off. But I do not see this as an
essential part of the brute luck egalitarian position, as brute luck egalitarians are indifferent between
equalities and inequalities, provided no brute luck is present. I therefore set aside Dworkin’s strong po-
sition, which positively appraises (some) option luck inequalities, and instead consider his arguments as
support for the weaker position that we should be indifferent between option luck equality and inequal-
ity. If the weaker position can be defeated – that is, if we should favour option luck equality over option
luck inequality – then of course the stronger position will also have been defeated.
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[T]he effect of redistribution from winners to losers in gambles would be to de-
prive both of lives they prefer, which indicates, not simply that this would pro-
duce an unwanted curtailment of available forms of life, but that it would de-
prive them of an equal voice in the construction of lots to be auctioned …’
(Dworkin 2000: 75).
Although Dworkin here refers to his hypothetical auction mechanism for setting fair
shares, the details of which need not detain us as our concern is with luck egalitarian-
ism (which typically uses unrelated measures of equality),15 the more general point
must be addressed. Would cancelling the effects of option luck lead to a disadvantag-
ing of would-be gamblers relative to non-would-be gamblers?
I do not see why this would be the case. In the first place there is the possibility that
gamblers would be unfairly advantaged were they to be allowed to gamble. Maybe as
a group the unfairly advantaged wealthy gamble more often, since they have greater
disposable income, and a prohibition on gambling (and risk taking of other sorts) is an
effective way of bringing their welfare levels into line with their responsible acts and
choices.16 Or maybe the unfairly disadvantaged poor gamble more often, but gambling
actually reduces their welfare levels below where they would be even on a regime
where gambling was prohibited (maybe there are more losers than winners and/or the
cost of losing is greater than the benefit of winning). It is quite possibly the case that
something close to both of these conditions applies – that the unfairly advantaged rich
gamble in a way that advantages them, that the unfairly disadvantaged poor gamble in
a way that disadvantages them, and so prohibition or redistribution serves luck
egalitarian goals twice over.
Furthermore, even if ruling out gambling (in its effects or altogether) did itself dis-
advantage gamblers unfairly (that is, in a way they were not responsible for) there
would be nothing to stop the luck egalitarian from compensating gamblers monetarily
or otherwise. Luck egalitarianism is often thought to justify large scale compensation
to disadvantaged individuals including many of the disabled and untalented. So why
could they not compensate gamblers using the redistributive mechanisms they would
already have in place? It might be replied that the difference is that gamblers would be
compensated for a disadvantage that the luck egalitarian distributive agency had cre-
ated, rather than for some naturally or socially occurring disadvantage, and that it
would make more sense for the distributive agency to not impose the disadvantage in
the first place, just as it would make sense for them to prevent severe disabilities and
talent shortfalls were it simple to do that. But the crucial difference is in the two pre-
ventative measures. The inexpensive prevention of severe disabilities and talent short-
falls would prevent unchosen disadvantages without creating any additional ones, so
there is some good and no bad to the measure from an egalitarian perspective. But al-
lowing gambling and not redistributing the result would prevent one form of unchosen
disadvantage (frustration derived from reduced gambling opportunities) at the cost of
creating inequalities between people who have made identical choices (and thus exer-
15 For detailed discussion of Dworkin’s argument see Lippert-Rasmussen 2001: 554-7.
16 I only refer to welfare, not resources, in this and the subsequent two paragraphs as preventing gambles
would have no effect of disadvantaging gamblers as a group in terms of objective resources (for exam-
ple, money). Preventing gambles might, as Dworkin suggests, reduce resource shares in his preferred
subjective sense, which takes into account individual preference, but that sense is not preferred by luck
egalitarians. Arneson and Cohen are typical in measuring advantage using welfare and a welfare/objec-
tive resource hybrid respectively; see Arneson 1989; 1990; Cohen 1989; 1993.
cised their responsibility identically). In the gambling case, moreover, the good (no
frustration from reduced gambling opportunities) is significantly outweighed by the
bad (unequal gambling outcomes). This is because the frustration could have been
compensated for, while the unequal outcome cannot be compensated for (unless we
effectively undo the gamble).
I submit that to allow gambles to stand is to allow a morally arbitrary influence on
distribution, while preventing them or redistributing their effects need not create a
morally arbitrary influence on distribution if would-be gamblers are compensated for
their reduced opportunities. Furthermore, I believe that we should not only prohibit or
correct for gambles, but prohibit or correct for all forms of option luck. The wager
which turns on a coin toss or roll of the dice is special only in that things are clear cut.
Any action for which there is a range of possible outcomes is a gamble of a sort, even
if the action is involuntary, and the unfairness of an outcome where two persons make
identical choices but receive different results remains the same even if those results are
not immediately obvious. If two identically capable people choose to pursue different
careers with identical prospects and identical demands, and each exerts an identical
degree of conscientious effort in support of it, there is moral arbitrariness in an out-
come of one becoming a millionaire and the other a pauper on account of some change
in the marketplace which neither foresaw. The best strategy for the egalitarian is
therefore to prevent gambles or redistribute after the event to losers from winners and,
if redistribution is made, to compensate the ‘winner’ wherever an unchosen welfare
loss arises.17 In the next section I suggest how this strategy might be incorporated in an
account of egalitarian justice. We must abandon brute luck egalitarianism of any form
as it is not true to the motivation of combating the effects of the morally arbitrary.
7. Denying Distributive Luck
I propose that the best egalitarian position agrees with the revised brute luck egalitar-
ian that distributive justice should be discontinuous with personal ethics but disagrees
on the question of option luck. This position is a strongly sceptical view on distribu-
tive luck. That is, egalitarians should deny distributive luck in all its forms – as option
luck as well as as constitutive and circumstantial luck. To deny distributive luck is to
say that people can only be due more than others through exercising their
responsibility differently.
The motivation for this position should be clear given the foregoing discussion.
Egalitarians seek to ensure that no individual is arbitrarily advantaged over another.
One compelling construal of non-arbitrary advantaging appeals to the significance of
individuals’ choices and exercises of responsibility. While revised brute luck egalitari-
anism comes close to realizing the goal of non-arbitrary inequalities it fails in one cru-
cial regard, for its focus on allowing inequalities where they reflect genuine choice is
insufficiently discriminating. Some inequalities reflect genuine choices, as they reflect
the gambles individuals have chosen to take, yet are unfair as the results of the genu-
ine choices are uneven. By denying distributive luck we refuse to allow this element of
arbitrariness to creep in, and so remain true to the egalitarian goal. We require not
merely, as the revised position requires, that inequalities are traceable to exercises of
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cases it may be that the welfare loss resulting from the gamble being undone exceeds the welfare value
of the stake.
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responsibility, but that the inequalities arise from differences exercises of responsibil-
ity. For the revised brute luck egalitarian, two identical genuine choices may have dif-
ferent distributive implications on account of how they work out. For the denier of
distributive luck identical genuine choices always have the same distributive
implications, and only different choices have different implications.
The proposal that egalitarians should deny distributive luck has arisen in the litera-
ture in the last few years but not under that name. Alexander Cappelen and Ole
Frithjof Norheim approvingly cite luck egalitarianism’s apparent implication ‘that in-
dividuals should be held responsible for their choices, not for the consequences of
their choices’, with individuals being held responsible for consequences ‘only in the
special case where the outcome depends solely on the individual’s choices and not on
any other factors’.18 As we have seen, it is central to the brute luck egalitarian position
that individuals are held responsible for some of the consequences of their choices –
specifically, those that derive from option luck – and so Cappelen and Norheim’s posi-
tion is a departure from brute luck egalitarianism. Shlomi Segall has described this
new position, which he calls ‘all-luck egalitarianism’, in terms that bring out the simi-
larity of motivation and content with the proposal to deny distributive luck very
clearly.19 All-luck egalitarianism holds that ‘since luck is morally arbitrary, differential
option luck should be considered as unjust as differential brute luck’.20 The motivation
of distributive luck denial and all-luck egalitarianism is the same – the need to address
the arbitrariness of luck – as is their content: the positions seek to remove the differen-
tial distributive effects of all forms of luck.21 So these two positions are really just one
position, which holds that advantages must be the upshot of exercises of responsibility
without mediation by any form of luck.
I do not, then, claim that the positive position suggested by the foregoing critique of
brute luck egalitarianism is a new one. Nevertheless, there is an advantage to present-
ing the positive view in terms of denying distributive luck. The advantage is that it
makes clear the relationship between important positions in political philosophy and
important positions in ethics. If, as I have suggested, all-luck egalitarianism amounts
to denying distributive luck, then it is very closely related to those views which deny
moral luck or are otherwise strongly sceptical about it (see Jensen 1993; Rescher
1993; Richards 1993; Sverdlik 1993). Both views deny one aspect of luck’s purported
normative relevance. The difference between the views comes in whether the rele-
vance is moral or distributive. I understand the latter as specifically concerning advan-
tage levels, while the former may just concern praise or blame. Similar connections
between legal and moral philosophy have been explored in some detail (see Enoch and
Marmor 2007; Enoch 2008). The fact that discussion of the role of luck in political
philosophy has, up to now, remained so isolated from similar discussions in neigh-
18 Cappelen and Norheim 2005: 478-9.
19 Segall 2010: ch. 3. Elizabeth Anderson, like Segall a critic of all-luck egalitarianism, refers to the view
as ‘desert-catering luck egalitarianism’ (see Anderson 2008). For discussion of all-luck egalitarianism
and related positions see Roemer 1993; Lippert-Rasmussen 2001; 2005; Barry 2008; Cohen 2009.
20 Segall 2010: 47.
21 There is a terminological difference here which has no practical impact. While I have presented distrib-
utive luck denial as being concerned with eliminating the effects of constitutive, circumstantial, and op-
tion luck, Segall presents all-luck egalitarianism as being concerned with eliminating option luck and
brute luck. This has no impact as the two groupings are each intended to be exhaustive of available
forms of luck; for this point regarding option luck and brute luck see Lippert-Rasmussen 2001: 551.
bouring fields may be partly because of the barrier presented by terms such as ‘luck
egalitarianism’. My suggestion is that we need not respect that barrier.
As is implied by my claim in section 4 that moral luck and distributive luck are dou-
bly dissociable, scepticism about one does not imply scepticism about the other. For
instance, in one of the very few passages that discusses moral luck in a distributive
context, Segall appears to be sceptical about moral luck but accepting of distributive
luck.22 Similarly, my sceptical position on distributive luck is compatible with that of
writers such as Williams and Nagel who accept moral luck (Williams 1976; Nagel
1976; see also Andre 1993; Walker 1993). But considerations that support the exis-
tence or non-existence of moral luck will also often support the existence or non-exis-
tence of distributive luck (and vice versa), for the simple reason that if luck is (not)
normatively relevant in one regard, it is more likely to (not) be normatively relevant in
another regard. David Enoch argues that ‘(1) [t]here is no moral luck’, ‘(2) [i]f there is
no moral luck, there should be no legal luck’, and ‘(3) [t]herefore there should be no
legal luck’.23 It is fanciful to suppose that no analogous arguments connecting moral
luck and distributive luck can be fashioned.24 In general, the stronger the evidence for
denying that it is relevant to our moral appraisal of Nagel’s mildly negligent truck
driver that he happened to run over a child, the stronger the evidence for denying that
it is relevant to distributive justice that a gambler happened to lose. And even where
that is not the case, we can learn much about distributive justice by paying attention to
the ways in which it is relevantly different from morality as regards luck.
8. Conclusion
I have suggested that egalitarians are committed to the Rawlsian goal of ensuring that
distributions are not influenced by the morally arbitrary, and that this commits them to
more than is usually supposed. The main existing accounts of egalitarian justice -
Rawls’ own justice as fairness and brute luck egalitarianism – appear to be incompati-
ble with this commitment. Dworkin’s version of brute luck egalitarianism aims to be
continuous with ordinary ethics and so is sensitive to actual choices. But Dworkin
does not present convincing reasons in support of continuity, so there is no justifica-
tion for the three sorts of morally arbitrary disadvantaging – based on constitutive
luck, circumstantial luck, and option luck – which the focus on actual choice allows.
Revised brute luck egalitarianism has the advantage of being sensitive to the right
thing – agent responsibility or genuine choice – and as a result does not disadvantage
on the basis of constitutive or circumstantial luck. But it is not as sensitive to responsi-
bility as it needs to be to fully extinguish the influence of the morally arbitrary, for
persons under it may exercise their responsibility equivalently yet end up with differ-
ent outcomes on account of option luck. Egalitarians would do well to reject brute luck
egalitarianism and instead deny that there can be any luck in the levels of advantage
that individuals are due.
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22 ‘[W]hile I disagree with the common approach to moral luck … according to which there is some moral
difference between lucky and unlucky drivers, I also disagree with its critics who say that the absence of
such moral difference requires equalizing their fates’ (Segall 2010: 54-5).
23 Enoch 2008: 24.
24 Michael Otsuka supports option luck versions of both moral luck and distributive luck; see Otsuka
2009; 2002.
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